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SPEECH
AFTER ATROCITY: OPTIMIZING UN ACTION
TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES




It is a great honor for me to be here to deliver the John Humphrey
Lecture. Humphrey led one of those lives within the UN that shaped what
the organization has become today—as one of the first generation of UN
civil servants, he was to human rights what Ralph Bunche was to
peacekeeping, or Brian Urquhart to UN mediation. To read his diaries, so
beautifully edited by John Hobbins, is to see a world that has in many
ways vanished, a nearly entirely male club, mostly of Westerners, that
hammered out new treaties and mechanisms over fine wine and cigars in
many a European tourist destination—as well as lesser sites like Lake Suc-
cess, New York—but also where the foundations were laid for projects still
central to the UN’s work.1 For without Humphrey’s Division of Human
Rights, there would be no Centre for Human Rights, and then High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, with his vast secretariat in Geneva and now
field office presences around the world.
Yet at the same time, I’m here today to talk about a topic that was not
the targets of John Humphrey’s energies – the UN’s role in holding indi-
viduals accountable for human rights atrocities. Individual accountability
is a broad concept.  It encompasses a range of processes that put the spot-
light on individuals for human rights abuses they have committed, mete
out consequences to them, and address in some meaningful way the legacy
of the abuses on victims. Humphrey’s cause, from the drafting the Univer-
sal Declaration on, was to create norms and mechanisms for holding states
responsible for violations of human dignity. Even though the Nuremberg
trials had recently concluded, indeed some of the lower-level trials were
being held while the UHDR was being negotiated, creating norms and
mechanisms for holding individuals accountable was not the priority, prob-
ably because it was seen as both less important and far more challenging
* The author is the Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan Law School.
1. A.J. Hobbins, On the Edge of Greatness: The Diaries of John Humphrey, First
Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights 1950-1951 (A.J. Hobbins ed.
1996).
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than holding states accountable. In reviewing his many writings about the
UN and human rights, I found that he barely wrote on the subject. His
1989 book No Distant Millennium had a brief treatment of the treaties on
slavery, genocide, and torture, each of which makes the banned conduct a
crime for which individuals must be prosecuted, but he really focused on
those treaties for their new obligations on states.2 Professor McDonald’s
long tribute to Humphrey in the 1991 Canadian Yearbook of International
Law mentions it only once, citing a 1988 speech in which Humphrey called
for the creation of a court of international criminal justice.3 So my talk
today is about a project whose importance for the UN became apparent
only in Humphrey’s final years and in the two decades since his death.
Other than a few reports and resolutions in the aftermath of the Nu-
remberg trials, both the member states and the Secretariat have focused
on individual accountability only since about 1992. In December of that
year, the Security Council passed a binding resolution, under Chapter VII
of the Charter, most famous for its authorization to a coalition of 26 states
to deliver food to starving Somalis. That resolution included a clause that
condemned violations of international humanitarian law in Somalia, but,
significantly, it also stated that “those who commit or order the commis-
sion of such acts will be held individually responsible.”4 It’s hard to know
what the Security Council’s members had in mind given the absence of any
Somali or international mechanisms for accountability. Yet from that
rather obscure starting point, we have seen the UN emphasize individual
accountability both as violations occur and in their aftermath. Accounta-
bility’s entrenchment in the UN today can be seen through institutional
expertise within the various organs and many NGOs, routine references to
it in Security Council resolutions, reports of numerous UN commissions of
inquiry, millions of pages of court documents from UN criminal tribunals,
and enormous scholarship.
With a topic so imposing, the subject of my talk today is relatively
modest—to ask what the United Nations can realistically do to foster
processes of individual accountability in states that are unaccustomed to
seeing their leaders and generals held to account for their crimes. I will
approach this topic by asking and answering four questions:
• first, should the UN be in the business of pushing the project
of individual accountability at all?;
• second, what are the modes of advancing accountability on
which the UN should focus?;
• third, what conditions are necessary for successful involvement
in furtherance of this goal?; and
2. JOHN HUMPHREY, NO DISTANT MILLENNIUM: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1989).
3. R. St. J. MacDonald, Leadership in Law: John P. Humphrey and the Development
of the International Law of Human Rights, in 29 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 3, 83
(1992).
4. S.C. Res. 794, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 4, 1992).
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• fourth, what are the key pitfalls for the UN along with way?
I aim to address all four in part through the lens of my academic work
on accountability, but also in light of two personal experiences I have had
as part of UN accountability mechanisms—the Secretary-General’s Group
of Experts for Cambodia and the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka. The first of these, which worked in 1998 and
1999, made recommendations for holding Khmer Rouge leaders accounta-
ble for their atrocities in the mid-1970s; the second, which operated in
2010 and 2011, made recommendations for steps Sri Lanka should take in
the aftermath of atrocities by the government and the Tamil Tigers in the
final six month of that state’s civil war.5
I.
So let me turn to the first question—should the UN be in the business
of promoting individual accountability at all? With the immense obstacles
to fulfilling its primary goals—prevention of armed conflict and fostering
respect for human rights—why should it take on a role that is not men-
tioned in the Charter, to achieve something for victims that is not listed as
part of their human rights in the Universal Declaration, and to ask states
to take action that is not included among their duties in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? More than two decades after that
resolution on Somalia, with billions spent on the two ad hoc tribunals and
accountability now “normalized” within the UN, I think it’s still a fair
question.
For even as I’ve written about and participated in UN accountability
processes, I have always been pulled toward seeing prevention and termi-
nation of human rights violations as a far greater priority. I spent two
years working for international institutions aimed at getting states and
non-state actors to follow the rules ex ante, with little emphasis on ac-
countability ex post. One was the High Commissioner on National Minori-
ties of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—a senior
European diplomat who, along with his staff, mediates tensions between
governments and minority groups in Eastern Europe.6 The other was the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the large Swiss-based NGO
with missions all over the world’s conflict zones, whose officials quietly try
to persuade governments and armed groups to follow the laws of war.7
5. For the final reports of these two panels, see U.N. Secretary-General, Letters dated
Mar. 15, 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assem-
bly and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/53/850, S/1999/231, Annex (Mar.
16, 1999); Marzuki Darusman, Steven Ratner & Yasmin Sooka, Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (Mar. 31, 2011) (hereinafter “POE
Report”), available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf.
6. Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?,
32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 591, 651 (2000).
7. Steven R. Ratner, Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion,
and the Laws of War, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 459 (2011).
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Neither spends much time pointing fingers at individuals but seeks to pre-
vent and terminate abuses first and foremost. Indeed, it is safe to say their
missions would be severely undercut if they focused on accountability.
The key to answering this question about the UN lies in another in-
quiry—what is the point of individual accountability at all? We hear so
many answers, from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, from
victims, from NGOs: it’s about meting out criminal justice to the perpetra-
tors; it’s about so-called closure for the victims; it’s about reparations; it’s
about national reconciliation. But all these arguments are incomplete for
me. For instance, my own experiences with victims reinforces the truism
that their claims are extraordinarily heterogeneous—some want a trial of
their abuser, some a confession, some a government acknowledgment of
responsibility, some an apology, some a summary execution of their
abuser, some their homes back, some reparations in the form of money,
and some the body, alive or dead, of a loved one. How can holding indi-
viduals accountable, whether judicially or not, fulfill all these inconsistent
demands? It cannot.
For me, the point of holding individuals responsible for human rights
abuses, and ultimately the point of UN involvement, is more basic. It’s
about prevention – prevention of further human rights abuses and thus, in
the end, domestic tranquility.
The person who first made this connection clear to me was Thomas
Hammarberg, a Swedish human rights defender who was the UN’s Special
Representative for Cambodia in the mid-1990s. Hammarberg sensed that
one of the root causes of Cambodia’s continued tragedy of human rights
violations by the government – at the time, and to this very day, led by the
extremely effective Hun Sen – was a culture of impunity. That culture sig-
naled to governmental leaders that they could violate rights without fear
of personal consequences of any kind, not even public criticism. Ham-
marberg traced that pathology to the lack of any accountability for Cam-
bodia’s Khmer Rouge leaders, those who, from 1975–78, killed a fifth of
Cambodia’s population. Though ousted from office by Vietnam, the
Khmer Rouge leadership, as of the late 1990s, remained at large; and the
full truth had never been told either. Hammarberg wanted to end that
impunity, ultimately ginning up the gears of the UN to create the Group of
Experts on which I served, beginning a process that eventually led to trials
of the handful of remaining leaders through a Cambodian-UN tribunal
operating in Phnom Penh.8
And I saw this connection a decade later in the aftermath of Sri
Lanka’s civil war. From late 2008 to May 2009, the government, intent on
ending Sri Lanka’s twenty year civil war, squeezed the Tamil Tigers in the
northeast part of the island in a relentless military barrage that probably
killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians. In the months afterwards,
the government denied that its actions had led to any civilian deaths. Why
8. On the development and operation of the Khmer Rouge tribunal, see generally
JOHN CIORCIARI & ANNE HEINDEL, HYBRID JUSTICE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN
THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (2014).
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was it so important to figure out a way to look into who was responsible,
on both sides, for what happened? Because it seemed as if Sri Lanka’s
contemporary history had revealed again that prior impunity simply lays
the groundwork for the next round of atrocities. For earlier governments
had never been held to account for violent tactics against Tamils and mod-
erate Sinhalese, giving the current government a green light for its final
assault. A failure to look into what happened in the end of that war was
merely laying the seeds for more violence in the future.9
So the ultimate purpose of accountability is not, for me, truth, retribu-
tion, reparation, or even national reconciliation, though those are ingredi-
ents of it—it’s rather about prevention of future conflict, within and
between nations. It offers a strategy that merely holding states responsible
cannot do. International relations scholars have developed many theories
for why states violate or comply with international rules. But I don’t think
we need to study much of that theory to know that, when an individual
leader or soldier believes that he will face consequences for breaking the
rules, he is less likely to do so. If we can pierce the veil of the state—break
down its structure—by identifying which institutions and individuals
within it oversaw and committed the abuses, we have introduced a new
dynamic of both deterrence and internal reform. In a way, it’s the flip-side
of the notion of subsidiarity—just as decisions and rules should be made
the closest level possible to those affected by them, so violations of rules
should be identified and rectified at the closest level possible to those re-
sponsible for those violations.
I suppose my view makes me fundamentally a consequentialist or util-
itarian when it comes to accountability. It is not that I think the victims do
not deserve justice or the perpetrators deserve punishment—the essence
of a more Kantian approach to accountability. I myself have never been
the victim of a serious crime, so I cannot put myself in their shoes. But I do
think the preventive argument is the most powerful reason among them.
In that respect, promoting individual accountability is central to the mis-
sion of the UN when it comes to promotion of peace and not marginal to
it.
My position does not mean that individual accountability is sufficient
or necessary to prevent future internal or interstate conflict. It is not suffi-
cient, for certainly much else goes into conflict prevention. States like Ca-
nada and international organizations like the UN concerned about
promoting respect for human rights abroad have only so much diplomatic
and monetary capital to invest, and in some situations individual accounta-
bility may not be the top priority as a preventive strategy. And I would
argue that I am not even convinced that it is always necessary; I would not
rule out the possibility that a state that does not engage in that process can
have a peaceful future. But in many situations, where a culture of impunity
is a cause of past conflict or a potential cause of future conflict, accounta-
bility is part of the solution. And if the state itself will not begin the pro-
9. POE Report, supra note 5, ¶¶ 429–42.
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cess, then the UN has a responsibility under the Charter to get them to do
so – a responsibility that derives from the consequences of impunity for
internal peace.
II.
If individual accountability fits within the UN’s conflict prevention
and human rights mandates, what is the right role for the UN as an institu-
tion in particular? Since that resolution on Somalia back in 1992, we have
seen the UN try three approaches. One, typified by that resolution and
dozens after it, is to remind the parties to a conflict, or a government re-
pressing its population, that individuals should, or even will, be held re-
sponsible for atrocities. But of course such reminders or promises are
fairly worthless if the UN and member states do nothing to actually jump-
start a process of accountability.
The second has been the creation of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals—those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda—and of hybrid
tribunals—in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, East Timor, and Lebanon. As
much as the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have
brought many violators to justice, they are a very limited option for the
UN for a few reasons. Criminal courts are expensive—especially the full
UN courts; and, in addition, these procedures deal with only one aspect of
accountability and not the range of issues that need to be addressed as a
conflict prevention strategy.
Most important, as I will discuss more, conditions often do not make
trials of former officials remotely realistic in the short term. The very ele-
ments that give individual punishment some added value over state re-
sponsibility as a response to human rights abuses create huge resistance
when the UN proposes prosecuting governmental officials. The same resis-
tance comes up in the case of universal jurisdiction, where one state pro-
poses to prosecute the officials of another. To see the difference between
state accountability and individual accountability, one particularly poign-
ant example is the outcome of the 1985 Rainbow Warrior episode, where
France blew up a Greenpeace vessel in New Zealand, killing a Green-
peace member. France and New Zealand were able to agree on the terms
of compensation by France, but they sparred at length over the punish-
ment of two French agents responsible, ending in their extrication by
France.10 In a word, when justice becomes personal, so do the reactions to
it.
So I turn to the third, and in my view, most promising role for the UN
in terms of added value—the preliminary investigation of serious human
rights violations, accompanied by the development and advocacy of op-
tions for the state to advance individual accountability. Whether done
through formal commissions of inquiry, groups of experts, or otherwise,
10. For an account, see JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 16–22
(4th ed. 2015).
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this process builds on a long tradition within the UN. It traces its legal
pedigree to Article 36 of the Charter, which authorizes the Security Coun-
cil to engage in something called “enquiry,” a fancy term for the determi-
nation of facts when they are contested by parties to a dispute. Building on
the experience of the League of Nations, the drafters of the Charter un-
derstood that the mere clarification of facts can pave the way for two war-
ring sides to negotiate the settlement of a dispute.11 In addition, Dag
Hammarskjold asserted the Secretary-General’s inherent authority to en-
gage in fact-finding under Article 99 of the Charter.12 And the General
Assembly recognized the importance of fact-finding in a key resolution in
1991.13 As a result, the Secretary-General and various commissions of the
Security Council have done precisely this in numerous inter-state disputes
since the UN’s founding. Just as figuring out the facts contributes to the
possibility of solutions to interstate disputes, so, in the aftermath of human
rights atrocities, the mere clarification of facts is a huge step forward. This
is particularly true if one party simply offers a narrative that denies any
responsibility for atrocities.
And indeed as Hammarskjold first demonstrated decades ago, the UN
has a special credibility when it comes to fact-finding. The international-
ized Secretariat helps rebut charges by the individuals or states being in-
vestigated that the UN is doing one state’s bidding. Yet that credibility
does not come solely from the Secretariat, and in fact relying on the Secre-
tariat alone for such projects is not wise. For the Secretariat is by its nature
extremely cautious and will not want to offend powerful member states.
More important, the Secretary-General and interested member states will
have greater leverage to work with the report’s conclusions if they can say
that they in no way influenced the content of the report. Thus, fact-finding
bodies, at least in the area of human rights, have been, and need to be,
headed by outsiders not beholden to the UN or its members. Their inde-
pendence creates distance between the report and those who will use it,
permitting the SG or others seeking to promote accountability to take a
sort of political cover behind the reputation of the commissioners.
With that credibility, however, comes a responsibility. It means that
UN investigations must be impartial and thorough. It means that man-
dates of investigative bodies must be even-handed, addressing the viola-
tion of both sides, that commissioners must be chosen to avoid even the
appearance of partiality, and that investigators must be chosen who have
open minds and specialized skills. Even with all those ingredients, some
states may not find the UN to be a credible agent to gather facts. But,
unlike the investigation by another government or even a well-respected
NGO (typically funded by Western sources), in the case of UN involve-
ment, the burden will be on the state to show that the UN is biased.
11. See UNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 1
(1992).
12. THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N.
DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO ABOUT IT 124 (1985).
13. GA Res. 46/59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/59 (Dec. 9, 1991).
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But fact-finding itself is only one facet of that third UN approach. The
UN’s credibility and expertise also give it the ability, and indeed I would
say the responsibility, to do more—to explain whether and how the abuses
violate international law, and, most important, to explain what response is
expected of the actors involved in the wake of such atrocities. Explain to
whom? First and foremost to the state—its citizens and its government—
to guide and nudge them in a direction that will be to the state’s long-term
advantage. But also to other actors—foreign states and civil society—who
can use their influence to get the government to do what it must.
And the UN has indeed made huge strides in explaining to states what
is expected of them in terms of responses. The Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights and outside experts have canvassed treaty law
and best practices to come up with a set of international standards. From
the so-called Joinet principles on impunity14 to the OHCHR toolkit on
transitional justice,15 the UN has elaborated on what states need to do if
they want an effective process for truth-telling, reparations, criminal jus-
tice, disqualification from office, or other strategies. These standards do
not represent a one-size-fits-all requirement for all states, and much of
them are more what international lawyers call soft law rather than binding
rules. But they nonetheless give a sense of what a responsible state in to-
day’s world is expected to do regarding accountability in the aftermath of
mass atrocities.16
III.
Having described why the UN should be a leading player on promot-
ing individual accountability and what I believe to be it most promising
role, I now want to offer what I regard as the necessary conditions for
successful UN engagement. This is a tricky task. The UN’s experience in
human rights fact-finding now encompasses about two dozen panels in the
last few decades, depending on how one counts.17 Not all of these have
addressed or been aimed at promoting the responsibility of individuals. At
this stage, neither the UN nor academia has done a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the results of each of these missions. So I propose to look at the
question in more strategic and structural terms—to offer, based on my
own observations of the processes that I have followed, what I would re-
14. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/
102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005).
15. UNDP-OHCHR Toolkit for Collaboration with National Human Rights Institu-
tions, 3.10 Transitional Justice, http://www.unssc.org/web2/free_resources/UNDP-OHCHR
Toolkit/chapter3/3-10.html.
16. See POE Report, supra note 5, ¶¶ 262–77.
17. For a list of 50 missions based on a broader definition, see OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AND FACT-FINDING MIS-
SIONS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: GUIDANCE AND
PRACTICE 114-141 (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_
and_Practice.pdf.
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gard as the most important variables affecting the success of fact-finding
missions.
But we already see a definitional thicket on the horizon, for what is
success for the UN when it comes to promoting individual accountability
and combating impunity? Success is not putting most abusers on trial; it is
not satisfying most victims; and it is not revealing the whole truth. Success
varies from state to state, but its minimal core is the initiation of a process
that will hold individuals accountable in some way for their actions and lay
some seeds for ending a culture of impunity. That should ideally include at
least one of the following: investigations of credibly alleged violations, a
national dialogue in which victims can speak to the government, a fair
public account of the events, or an acknowledgment of wrongdoing and
apology. The UN can really do no more than encourage, or, if that fails,
push a state to do these, and its success or failure may not be evident for
years afterwards. Perhaps in another generation we can define success
with a higher set of expectations on the UN, but at this fairly early stage in
seeking to get governments to hold individuals accountable, this minimal
core seems enough for the UN.
In my view, the success of UN engagement is a product of three fac-
tors—transitions, alliances, and creativity. The first factor is the transi-
tion—that is, the status of the political transition within the state—the
movement, if any, away from the regime that committed the abuses. Tina
Rosenberg’s observations from her magnificent 1995 book The Haunted
Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism, ring as true as ever. As
she explained in contrasting the experiences of Latin America and Eastern
Europe in dealing with their past, the strength of the successor regime,
along with the extent and type of abuses endured by the country, exerts a
powerful influence on the course accountability takes.18 The same holds
true regarding the success of UN involvement to promote accountability.
Where the former regime is gone and discredited, as was the case with
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge or Rwanda’s genocidaire regime, both over-
thrown militarily, the government will typically be quite receptive to
accountability.
Where, at the other extreme, the government that committed the
abuses is still in power—where, in a word, there is no transition—as with
Sri Lanka since 2009, the obstacles to accountability are enormous, maybe
even insurmountable for as long as that regime is in power.19 The same
holds true for the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Council’s
investigatory commission on Syria, or those of the independent commis-
sion investigating the 2011 events in Bahrain.20 There are few, if any
18. TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE’S GHOSTS AFTER COM-
MUNISM (1995).
19. In January 2014, after delivery of this lecture, Sri Lankan President Mahinda
Rajapaksa was voted out of office. The position of the new government regarding accounta-
bility remains uncertain.
20. Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Human
Rights Council, 27th Sess., Sept. 8-26, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014); MAH-
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precedents for a regime that commits massive violations of human rights
to investigate its leaders.
Even where there is a formal transition but the abusers retain informal
levers of power, the government will resist accountability. In the case of
Cambodia, Hun Sen endorsed the idea of trials of the Khmer Rouge, but
also wanted to make sure that any UN tribunal would investigate only
those who were old and fully discredited, not other former Khmer Rouge
members who were now his allies in government or his partners in
business.
In these sorts of cases, the government will refuse to apply the impres-
sive standards developed by the UN under the rubric of transitional jus-
tice, and or fulfill the duties it accepted in treaties. But UN can at least lay
the groundwork for future accountability, once the people of the state
have decided that they have had enough of those who committed
atrocities.
Whereas the first factor is internal to the state, the second factor, what
I call alliances, is external to it. It refers to the political connections be-
tween the elites in the state and those outside of it. Where the government
has powerful allies within the United Nations—and here I mean the mem-
ber states—the possibility that the UN will undertake investigations, let
alone step in and create something like an ad hoc tribunal, is significantly
reduced. Where the government lacks such allies, the UN will have a freer
reign. In other words, alliances help determine the leverage of the United
Nations—whether it can take the first step of looking into the past atroci-
ties and then later persuade the state to make moves in the direction of
accountability.
Alliances will also influence which part of the UN will take the lead on
fact-finding, or even whether the UN itself will play a role. If a permanent
member of the Security Council is a friend of a government committing
the abuses, the Security Council is out as a venue for creating an investiga-
tory body; but the Human Rights Council may not be. And the Secretary-
General himself may initiate action if those alliances preclude action by
any political body, although he may have reasons not to challenge a partic-
ular country as well.
In this context, one can contrast the willingness of the Security Coun-
cil to create commissions of inquiry for Sudan and Lebanon21 with the
absence of Security Council investigations of Syria in its civil war, of the
two sides in the two Gaza wars, or even of something like civilian casual-
MOUD CHERIF Bassiouni ET AL., BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMM’N OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF
THE BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY Dec. 10, 2011) available at http://
www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf.
21. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to S/RES/1564 (2004)
(Jan. 25, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf; U.N. Sec-
retary-General, Letter dated Oct. 20 2005 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/662 (Oct. 20, 2005) available at http://www.un.
org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2005/662.
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ties caused by drone attacks in Pakistan. With the Council blocked, the
Human Rights Council created commissions of inquiry for Syria and
Gaza;22 and the Council’s thematic mechanisms offer some kind of review,
if not a real investigation, of civilian casualties caused by drone strikes.23
Sometimes member states block action in all the UN’s political organs,
and here I want to return to Sri Lanka. Despite its size and relatively insig-
nificant strategic position, Sri Lanka has many allies in the UN system.
Like talented jazz musicians, the Rajapaksa brothers have played the G77/
sovereignty tune in many keys, with many riffs, with many states. China,
which sees investment opportunities there, will support it to the hilt. And
the states that care most about accountability in the end have little lever-
age – little more than embarrassing the government by not showing up at
a Commonwealth meeting. As a result, while many officials within the UN
saw a need to get an accountability process started within Sri Lanka, the
writing was on the wall in 2009 that neither the Security Council nor the
General Assembly nor the Human Rights Council would initiate any in-
vestigation. Nor would Sri Lanka request UN assistance, a hook that had
allowed the Secretary-General to create other commissions, such as that
investigating the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.24
When Secretary-General Ban saw the impossibility of approval from a
political organ for a full commission, he created the Panel of Experts on
which I served. Sensing that Sri Lanka’s supporters might see the panel as
an end-run around the political organs, he deliberately devised a mandate
that never used the word investigation, but instead was focused on giving
advice to the Sri Lankan government on international standards and best
practices regarding accountability. At the same time, officials within the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ensured that the man-
date included the phrase that the panel would have “regard for the nature
and scope of alleged violations,” a clause that allowed our group to offer
detailed views on which allegations were credible enough to merit a full
investigation.25
The third necessary condition for success in UN efforts to promote
accountability, creativity, is different from the other two, for it is neither
internal to the state, nor a matter of inter-state relations, but internal to
the UN itself. For accountability is no different from the rest of the UN’s
22. Human Rights Council Res. S-17/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th Spec.
Sess., A/HRC/S-17/2 (Aug. 22, 2011); Human Rights Council Res. S-9/1, Rep. of the Human
Rights Council, 9th Spec. Sess., A/HRC/RES/S-9/1 (Jan. 12, 2009); Human Rights Council
Res. S-22/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 22nd Spec. Sess., A/HRC/RES/S-22/1 (Sept.
3, 2014).
23. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, U.N. Human Rights
Council, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/59 (Mar. 11, 2014).
24. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the United Nations Comm’n of Inquiry into the
facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma
Benazir Bhutto, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Pakistan/UN_Bhutto_Report_15April
2010.pdf.
25. For the mandate of the Panel, see POE Report, supra note 5, ¶ 5.
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human rights project in this regard, where progress is slow and new venues
and approaches must constantly be invented. Creativity encompasses
many virtues, including persistence through short-term defeat, compro-
mise, and diplomacy. In the case of Cambodia, the group of experts rec-
ommended in March 1999 a full-fledged ad hoc tribunal to try the Khmer
Rouge because we concluded that the Cambodian courts could not mete
out impartial justice. Our central recommendation was not, however, ac-
cepted by Secretary-General Annan, who instead opened up negotiations
between his lawyers and the Cambodian government on a hybrid UN-
Cambodia tribunal option. Those talks took four years to complete. The
Secretary-General, with some prodding by the General Assembly, com-
promised along the way. He accepted the key Cambodian demands for a
tribunal with a majority Cambodian-government-appointed judges and
two co-prosecutors, one from the UN and one picked by the Cambodian
government.26 Now, I personally think all these compromises were a huge
mistake and wonder whether the effort has been worth it for the convic-
tion by the hybrid tribunal of three very old Khmer Rouge leaders. But I
recognize that others see this as a partial success. And most important, I
don’t object to the notion of compromise for its own sake. Responding to
political realities is essential for some process; and I cannot offer any
grand theory for when compromise has gone too far.
Creativity and persistence proved critical with respect to Sri Lanka.
There Ban Ki-Moon’s pivot to create the Panel of Experts in the face of
lack of support within the political organs was, in my view, inspired. In-
deed, I think it can be a model for future action by the Secretary-General
to assert the UN’s responsibility regarding accountability even when the
member states in the political organs refuse to do so.27 However, after the
Panel’s report was issued, it very unfortunately became clear that the Sec-
retary-General would not follow our key recommendation to create a full-
fledged commission of inquiry on his own. So governments and NGOs
turned their energies again to the Human Rights Council. The results: a
broad coalition of states in the Council passed resolutions in 2012 and 2013
critical of the government and urging it to do something serious on the
accountability front.28 When Sri Lanka still did nothing, OHCHR, mem-
ber states, and NGOs persisted, and the Council at last authorized
OHCHR to conduct a full investigation this past spring which is now
under way.29 I am not fully satisfied with either the Secretary-General’s
passing of the buck to the Council or the Council’s ultimate resolution—
26. CIORCIARI & HEINDEL, supra note 8, at 34-35.
27. Steven R. Ratner, Accountability and the Sri Lankan Civil War, 106 AM. J. INT. L.
795, 797–798 (2012).
28. Human Rights Council Res. 19/2, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 19th Sess.,
A/HRC/RES/19/2, (Apr. 3, 2012); Human Rights Council Res. 22/1, Rep. of the Human
Rights Council, 22nd Sess., A/HRC/RES/S-22/1 (Sept. 3, 2014).
29. Human Rights Council Res. 25/1, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 25th Sess.,
A/HRC/RES/25/1 (Apr. 9, 2014).  As this article went to press, OHCHR released its report,
which can be found at UN Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP/2 (Sept. 16, 2015).
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it’s far short of a full-fledged commission, and the funding is not what it
needs to be – but I do think it’s a major step forward in investigating that
which the government will not.
IV.
That takes me to the final issue—the traps that the UN—the Secreta-
riat and the member states—need to avoid in the pursuit of individual
accountability. I want to speak here about traps, rather than shortcomings,
because I think the latter topic could occupy a whole conference—we
know the UN has much to do to improve the internal workings of individ-
ual fact-finding bodies. Suffice it to say that these bodies lack sufficient
funding from the member states and institutional support within the Secre-
tariat, and often have to re-invent the wheel in their operations.30
As for the traps, in my view there are four of them. First is what I will
call the international criminal law trap. Many advocates of accountability,
for the very best of reasons, wish to see the atrocities and the perpetrators
solely through the lens of criminal law. Because we can legally character-
ize the perpetrators’ actions as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
occasionally even genocide, the first recourse or the best mechanism of
accountability becomes criminal trials. And if the state cannot undertake
them, then the remedy on which the international community should focus
is the International Criminal Court in The Hague. For these advocates,
commissions of inquiry may be a useful start, but their key purpose is to
gather evidence that will be handed over to a domestic or international
prosecutor.
This international criminal law approach strikes me as extremely
short-sighted, cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. First, in situations
where atrocities are ongoing, termination is more important than account-
ability. Thus, the Human Rights Council’s commission on Syria focused on
cessation first, barely mentioning accountability. And the report of the
commission on Libya is also very guarded in this respect. In rare cases,
criminal accountability can serve as a means to end ongoing violations—
the marginalization of Radovan Karadzic after his indictment by the ICTY
is a key example—but most of the time, the UN should make ending the
abuses the priority.
Second, even after atrocities, the international criminal law approach
ignores the reality that accountability is a gradual process, and a consensus
must be built for it; one cannot simply move directly to putting a state’s
leaders or former leaders in the dock, and certainly not at the ICC. A
demand by the UN for immediate trials of named individuals when a state
has no willingness to do so will merely allow opponents of accountability
to accuse the UN of undermining its sovereignty and wanting nothing
more than the heads of governmental leaders.
30. The OHCHR review of practices in prior missions, supra note 17, is a useful at-
tempt to help avoid the re-invention of the wheel.
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Thus, in the case of Sri Lanka, contrary to a number of key NGOs,
including the International Crisis Group, our report never recommended
criminal trials at the domestic or international level. Rather, realistically,
the first step needed to be some kind of full investigation of the atrocities,
if not by the government then by the UN. Had we advocated ICC trials, it
would have made it extremely difficult for groups within Sri Lanka to sup-
port our report without being accused of being traitors. A proposal to
have the ICC investigate the Sri Lanka situation would also have been
futile because the Court has no jurisdiction over the atrocities there. Sri
Lanka is not a party to the ICC Statute, meaning that the only way the
Court can legally investigate the events there is through a referral by the
Security Council, the possibility for which was, and is, frankly, zero. Cer-
tainly, referral to the ICC in some situations can be an important part of
accountability, and indeed it may be so in the half-dozen situations that
are currently the subject of trials in that Court. But the limited jurisdiction
of the ICC and the immense resistance that states often put up to handing
people over to it means that even if you believe in criminal justice as the
core element of accountability, its utility is still limited.
A second and somewhat related pitfall is what I would call the legalist
trap. Advocates of accountability fall into that trap when they see account-
ability, or the UN’s role in it, purely in legal terms—getting states to meet
their legal duties under treaties, for instance—and not as a fundamentally
political process. The result can be NGO reports and recommendations or
academic pieces with a remarkably tin ear for the realities of a post-atroci-
ties situation. In fact, one of the key goals for any UN panel investigating
the facts and making recommendations—certainly it was for us working
on the Sri Lanka report—must be to gain domestic support for accounta-
bility first and foremost, with international support critical as well. That
does not mean ignoring a state’s legal obligations and international stan-
dards, but a report that speaks only of a state’s legal duties, and not, for
instance, of the importance to the state of accountability in a way sensitive
to the politics of the country, will resonate well with law professors but not
with politicians and civil society.31 Politics does and should affect the inter-
pretation of a commission’s mandate, the tone of the report, and the rec-
ommendations. Fact-finding, then, demands political expertise and
awareness among those undertaking it, and not just legal expertise. And,
without doubt, the follow-up to the work of any panel by states and NGOs
that wish to promote accountability demands exceptional political skills.
Third, and in contradistinction to the other two, is the selectivity trap.
UN fact-finding cannot maintain credibility with the broad membership
and, even more important, with the target of the inquiry if it is seen as
doing only the bidding of certain groups of states. Decisions to investigate
only one side in a war, or to investigate one set of atrocities but not an-
other, over time erode the process of fact-finding.32 Some of this can be
31. Ratner, supra note 27, at 802.
32. The most glaring instance was the Human Rights Council’s resolution setting up an
investigatory panel on Israel’s conduct in the 2008-09 Gaza War, which the High Commis-
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addressed through the work of the thematic rapporteurs of the Human
Rights Council, who address any country’s violations that fall within their
mandate. But most of them lack the resources for serious investigations.
Here I think that the selectivity problem invites a special role for the Sec-
retary-General. If state interests skew the work of the political bodies, the
Secretary-General should be prepared to create new mechanisms of some
kind.
Fourth, and finally, is the defeatist trap. Those who fall into this see
the obstacles to accountability as so insurmountable that they want to wait
for a better time, or pass the buck to someone else to do the hard diplo-
matic work. In the aftermath of our Cambodia report, despite a clear in-
ternational consensus on the gravity of the Khmer Rouge’s crimes, most
states did not want to do anything at all about bringing its leaders to jus-
tice. Perhaps that could be chalked up to the amount of time that had
elapsed since the atrocities, on the theory that it was just as well to let
sleeping dogs lie, or to the cost of a new ad hoc tribunal. But how do we
justify the same reaction by most states to the more modest call for an
international investigation in the immediate aftermath of the Sri Lanka
war?
Even after our report placed the UN imprimatur of credibility on the
allegations of atrocities and revealed the big lie of the government, many
states waited for others to take the lead on action within the UN—even
states like Canada that had said they really cared about accountability. In
that case, it was the leadership of one individual, Eileen Donahoe, the
U.S. Ambassador the Human Rights Council, who mobilized the State
Department juggernaut and eventually persuaded a majority of Council
members to pass the first serious resolution on accountability in Sri Lanka.
States will need to continue to press the targets of UN inquiries to act on
the recommendations in those reports, or they become dead letters over
time. A look at the recommendations of many such bodies reveals the gap
between them and governmental action. So politics, diplomacy, compro-
mise, yes; but waiting for someone else to act or just allowing time to take
its course, it’s really just a way of a government convincing itself that
something will happen when it will not.
CONCLUSION
Let me conclude by quoting the words of John Humphrey. For despite
his orientation toward state accountability, he did recognize the impor-
tance of holding individuals responsible. In No Distant Millennium, he
quoted Lester Pearson’s remarks in Parliament in 1952 regarding the 1948
Genocide Convention, the first UN treaty to make a crime out of a human
rights violation. Pearson had said “it is possibly the most important source
of new international law which has developed since the last war;” and
Humphrey added that “insofar as the Convention, like the war-crimes tri-
sioner for Human Rights chose to interpret as allowing the commission to investigate both
Israel’s and Hamas’ conduct.
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als after the Second World War, weakens the principle of collective re-
sponsibility and strengthens that of personal responsibility, Mr. Pearson’s
statement was probably true.”33 I am not sure that individual accountabil-
ity is more important than state accountability; perhaps Pearson’s hyper-
bole was just to get Parliament to ratify the Convention. I think
Humphrey certainly had his priorities right at the time.
But there can be no doubt that holding individuals to account is now a
highly significant method to promote compliance with international
human rights law – even as it is as threatening to some state officials as
human rights law remains to some governments. The structure that
Humphrey and his colleagues built for holding states accountable now has
a sprouted a new wing, in that organic, decentralized, and somewhat disor-
ganized way that the UN has grown in other areas. We now need to think
hard about how to shore up that wing and integrate it into the UN’s
greater missions in the promotion of human rights and the preservation of
peace.
33. HUMPHREY, supra note 2, at 196-197.




